NCBP Countries: FY13 Eligibility for the Different Options[1/]

Capacity	Debt Vulnerability: Lower	Debt Vulnerability: Higher
Lower	*Minimum concessionality requirement applied loan-by-loan, with added flexibility on non-concessional external debt (e.g., untied nonzero limits, if consistent with maintenance of low debt vulnerabilities)* Benin [2/] Burkina Faso [3/] Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Cote d'Ivoire [4/] Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Bissau Kyrgyz Rep. Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Nepal Nicaragua Niger [5/] Samoa [6/] Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia	*Minimum concessionality requirement applied loan-by-loan, likely higher than 35 percent, with limited or no room for non-concessional external borrowing* Afghanistan Burundi Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep of Gambia, The Guinea Haiti Kiribati Lao, PDR Maldives Marshall Islands [7/] Sao Tome and Principe Tajikistan Tonga Tuvalu [8/] Yemen, Rep.
Higher	*Minimum average concessionality requirement applied to external or total public borrowing. For most advanced IDA countries, no concessionality requirements and overall nominal debt limit if needed.* Mozambique Rwanda	*Overall limit on the PV of external or total public debt. For most advanced IDA countries, ceilings on nominal external or public debt.*

1/ Limited to active IDA-only countries that are subject to the IDA NCBP and excludes countries in nonaccrual status as of June 30, 2012 (Eritrea, Myanmar, Somalia, and Sudan).

2/ Benin's risk of debt distress has improved from "moderate" to "low" as all external debt indicators remain below their respective thresholds over the long run in the most recent DSA (Aug. 2011).

3/ Burkina Faso's risk of debt distress has improved from "high" to "moderate", based on updated gold export projections and new end-2011 debt data.

4/ Côte d'Ivoire's risk of debt distress is expected to improve from "high" to "moderate", as it reaches the completion point of HIPC/MDRI pending approval by the Executive Directors of the World Bank and the IMF.

5/ Niger's risk of debt distress worsened from "low" to "moderate". In the most recent DSA (Nov. 2011), the medium-term economic framework underpinning the analysis was revised to reflect new information on the financing of large oil and mining projects, including the contracting of a public guarantee on a large loan to finance the state's share in an oil refinery. While the various debt measures lie below the relevant thresholds for the baseline scenario, the ratios of the present value (PV) of debt to exports, to revenue, and to GDP breach the thresholds under the most extreme stress test.

6/ Samoa's risk of debt distress worsened from "low" to "moderate". Compared to the previous DSA (Apr. 2010), the latest analysis (June 2012) assumes a slightly lower long-term growth rate of GDP in the baseline given the less favorable external environment and that the impact of the reforms introduced in the 1990's could be tampering off. Even after Samoa's large inward remittances are taken into account under the revised framework, its risk of external debt distress has moved from low to moderate.

7/ No DSA available. Traffic light based on nominal debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010 (69.6%). Source: IMF (2011), Republic of the Marshall Islands 2011 Article IV Consultation. Report No. 11/339.

8/ Traffic light based on IMF's DSA available for Tuvalu (July 2012).